

TOP SECRET - ULTRA

Top Secret Ultra

ANNEX I

2 JANUARY 1946 MEMORANDUM TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. FLEET
FROM CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. ARMY

NSA, ARMY & ONI
Declassification/Release Instructions
on File

Copy

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

TOP SECRET ULTRA

2 January 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL NIMITZ:

SUBJECT: Signal Intelligence

Ref: (2) Your Top Secret memorandum dated 28 December 1945,
subject: Signal Intelligence.

After consideration of reference (a), together with the previous correspondence between General Marshall and Admiral King, I have come to the conclusion that we should make a fresh start on this entire subject.

It is clear that the Army and Navy have been in agreement throughout that much is to be gained from an integration of their signal intelligence efforts. As to the details of effecting that integration, there has been a great deal of misunderstanding. Because of our respective experiences as commanders of combined forces you and I realize how vital it is to resolve any differences of opinion and to achieve as complete an integration as possible. I am, therefore, fully in accord with your desire to arrive at an understanding which will result in better intelligence for us both.

I believe that the previous correspondence on this subject has failed to achieve any tangible results because the problems involved are far too complex for solution in personal correspondence between the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. For example, you list certain functions of signal intelligence which you feel are so intimately related to command responsibility that final authority over them must be retained by the Navy. I think it dangerous for us to attempt to list functions which we are unwilling to integrate before a complete study of the entire problem has been made. Consequently, I believe we should follow the procedure outlined in the following paragraphs.

TOP SECRET - ULTRA

Top Secret Ultra ANNEX I (Cont'd.)

I think we should return to the original proposal and again refer the question of integration of signal intelligence activities to the Army Navy Communications Intelligence Board. It seems to me that this Board should approach the problem without limitation and present detailed proposals for its solution, including the extent to which joint intelligence effort on Ultra will affect the communications aspect of the problem. If the Army and Navy members of the Board cannot agree on a solution, I think it would be helpful to us for them to present alternative proposals in order that we may be in full possession of the relative merits of both plans before we come to a decision.

I agree with your statement that this step need not await the final result of the study now being made by the State-War-Navy Committee on the formation of a Central Intelligence Agency. Therefore, if you concur in this proposal, I recommend that we instruct ANCIB to proceed immediately on the basis outlined above and that instead of placing restrictions on the Board, we instruct them now that you and I agree that there should and must be a complete and free exchange between our Army and Navy of everything pertaining to Ultra intelligence, directly or indirectly, or having to do with any aspect of intercept, cryptographic or cryptanalytic activities, systems, solutions, product or equipment.

/s/ DWIGHT EISENHOWER